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Abstract: This paper explores Ed Miliband’s evocation of One Nation in his 2012 Labour 
party conference speech. It first surveys the views of members of the Parliamentary Labour 
Party (PLP) and key advisors to Miliband on One Nation, with a focus on the debates 
surrounding its purpose and substance. What becomes clear is the amount of confusion 
amongst backbenchers and shadow cabinet members of the PLP regarding its purpose. 
Second, the paper explains the respective, and drastically different, positions of the Policy 
Review team and Ed Miliband and his leadership team over the purpose of One Nation. 
Third, this paper highlights that there was a fundamental disconnection between the two 
principal centres of policymaking under the tenure of Ed Miliband’s leadership and that this 
ultimately undermined One Nation by allowing Ed Miliband quietly to drop it for a ‘cost of 
living’ narrative. It concludes that the evocation of One Nation was a missed opportunity for 
the Labour party, which subsequently allowed the Conservatives to reclaim that territory. 
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Introduction 
‘One Nation’ was the central theme of Ed Miliband’s leadership speech to Labour conference in 
Manchester, 2012. In it, he spoke about Benjamin Disraeli and his vision of One Nation, remarking: 
“it was a vision of a Britain where patriotism, loyalty, dedication to the common cause courses 
through the veins of all and nobody feels left out. It was a vision of Britain coming together to 
overcome the challenges we faced” (Miliband 2012). He continued to explain that his own vision of 
One Nation was about capturing that spirit of a nation “where we have a shared destiny, a sense of 
shared endeavour and a common life that we lead together (Miliband 2012). As this article will 
show, the utilisation of an old Tory slogan was warmly received by political commentators in the 
British press. Yet, despite this warm praise, One Nation did not last long in the lexicon of Ed 
Miliband’s policy statements. This paper will argue that this was due to the ad hoc nature of 
Miliband’s One Nation idea and the competing perspectives within the party’s policymaking 
machinery.  
 
The following analysis draws on thirty semi-structured elite interviews with Labour MPs, including 
backbenchers, junior shadow ministers and senior cabinet members as well as key personnel in Ed 
Miliband’s office and principal members of the Policy Review team. Obviously such interviews need 
to be interpreted with care, so the arguments made by the interviewees have been checked against 
other sources with particular care towards examining potential differences with interviews 
undertaken before and after the 2015 general election. Unfortunately, the latter issue was 
unavoidable as some key interviewees would not undertake any interviews before the election. 
Quotes derived from interviewees after the general election are specified throughout the article. 
While some differences were apparent, for example the candid nature of the responses post-
election, certain key themes became clear regardless of when the interview took place. One such 
theme was the differing views on One Nation.  
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Two distinct views can be discerned from the interviews with various actors in the PLP, particularly 
from the two principal centres for policymaking in the Labour party: the leadership and the Policy 
Review team. The first view was that One Nation represented a short-term tactical repositioning of 
the party. This view emphasised that One Nation was merely a slogan that aimed to ‘steal the 
clothes of the Conservatives’. This was mainly held by the leadership team, especially the leader. The 
second view was that One Nation was a ‘big idea’ that could be used to construct a “policy narrative” 
to the public of the renewed purpose of the Labour party (Gaffney and Lahel 2013a: 494). This 
interpretation emphasised that One Nation conveyed a broader message and had the ability to 
combine a narrative or vision of a united society with concrete policies behind it. This view was 
primarily held by key members of the Policy Review team. These two competing interpretations 
created a generic view, mainly amongst the wider PLP, of confusion around the purpose of One 
Nation. This confusion resulted in many MPs not engaging with and eventually dismissing One 
Nation as a substantive idea. Thus, these competing views weakened the idea, making it easier for 
the leadership team to drop One Nation and move on to a ‘cost of living’ narrative that was based on 
a policy retail offer. 
 
Miliband’s One Nation 
Miliband attributed One Nation solely to the Conservative party, speaking specifically about 
Benjamin Disraeli. He did not cite or refer to the Labour party’s previous evocation of One Nation, 
the most recent of which was Blair’s and New Labour’s foray while in opposition in the 1990s (see 
Wickham-Jones 2013). Of course, Miliband was keen not to be closely associated with New Labour, 
emphasising in his first speech as Labour leader: “Be in no doubt. The new generation of Labour is 
different. Different attitudes, different ideas, different ways of doing politics” (Miliband 2010). While 
ignoring Labour’s previous excursions into One Nation was politically useful from an internal party 
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perspective, it was also useful from an external perspective. By citing Disraeli and One Nation 
conservatism, a policy platform which was largely constructed post-1945 (see Bridgen 2000; Walsha 
2000), Miliband purposively referred to an aspect of conservatism that explicitly concerned itself 
with the inequality gap between the rich and the poor. In opposition, Blair had talked about 
inequality when he evoked One Nation at the 1995 Labour party conference, but during New 
Labour’s term in office “incomes at the very top of the distribution saw the strongest growth…largely 
as a result of that most measures of income inequality nudged up” (Joyce and Sibieta 2013: 198). 
Tackling income inequality was one of Ed Miliband’s primary priorities and he was determined to 
move beyond New Labour, so any association with Blair’s use of One Nation would have been 
tainted by an association with New Labour more generally and its failure on tackling inequality more 
specifically. Therefore, he focused on One Nation, the Conservative idea. This tactic worked for 
Miliband in terms of the glowing press coverage his One Nation speech received. Polly Toynbee 
(2012), of the Guardian Newspaper, described it “as a stroke of genius”, D’Ancona (2013), then of 
the Spectator Magazine, believed Miliband “had struck gold”, while Steve Richards (2012), of the 
Independent Newspaper, thought it was the “political moment when New Labour gave way to One 
Nation Labour”. Such was the extent of the political commentariat’s approval that Peter Hitchens 
(2012) lamented in his regular Sunday Mail column that “Britain’s media pundits make sheep look 
like rugged individualists” because “it’s always more or less the same. The favoured one makes a 
speech and the word goes out ‘That was a great speech!’ and everyone says and writes that it was.”  
 
While some columnists thought the speech signified a profound moment when Labour moved 
beyond the dichotomy of ‘Old’ and ‘New’ to the territory of ‘One Nation’ Labour (Toynbee 2012), 
Miliband and his team interpreted this success as being based on “us [being] really clever because 
it’s stealing a Conservative term; therefore [Ed Miliband] was going on to Conservative territory”, 
explained a key advisor to Miliband. Amongst backbenchers of the PLP there was appreciation for 
5 
 
this tactical move, with one backbencher commenting that “it was a clever policy to pinch that idea; 
to pinch [the Tories’] clothes”. Thus, for the leadership and a few backbenchers, the success of One 
Nation was viewed as being based upon its political adeptness at capturing Conservative political 
territory. Yet, members of the PLP directly involved with One Nation reported that there was a 
broader argument over and above moving on to Conservative territory. One junior shadow minister 
argued that One Nation “was designed to say everyone should play their part”, while another 
described its purpose as bridging the divides the Conservatives were creating between “the public 
and private sectors, the young and the old and the North and the South. Innately people don’t like 
divides and One Nation is about bridging divides”.  These views did not disregard the political 
appropriation of One Nation from the Conservatives, but instead focused more on the attempt to 
use One Nation to develop a coherent national message that spoke to voters beyond the party’s 
electoral base; to speak to the country as a whole. 
 
In essence, both views represented two sides of the same coin. One Nation was a communicative 
tool that provided two political aims: (1) signalling a new Labour strategy that ‘imagined’ a new 
territory (Gaffney and Lahel 2013a: 494) and, (2) stealing the political clothes of the Conservative 
party. This duality of purpose was a recurring theme in a number of interviews with personnel in and 
around Ed Miliband. A senior shadow minister who laid claim to convincing Ed Miliband to adopt 
One Nation, stated that “our vision [was] a more equitable distribution of wealth and opportunity 
across Britain because without that Britain doesn’t succeed as a country. What is a way in which you 
articulate that in a catchy phrase and bluntly steal their clothes – One Nation”. A backbench MP and 
confidant to Ed Miliband corroborated this analysis and explained that “One Nation was a critique of 
the Tories, so as a politician you could see the advantage of it straight away, it [also] allowed us to 
have a go at them. It was an expression of the kind of society he wanted to create”.  I was informed 
that the society Miliband wanted to create was a more equal one, where being patriotic was about 
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ensuring no citizen or region was left behind. A leading member of the Policy Review team explicitly 
stated that One Nation was about getting “out of the perception of interest-based politics” and 
contesting the national story because “every time Labour won it has contested the national 
category”. According to this interviewee, this fundamentally required an engagement with 
patriotism, a subject with which this MP believed certain sections of the Labour party had been 
historically uncomfortable.  
 
The role of patriotism in the genesis of Ed Miliband’s evocation of One Nation should not be 
underplayed. In fact, it is fundamental. Marc Stears (2015), a friend and close advisor to Ed Miliband 
and co-author of the One Nation speech, explicitly stated after the election that “in the summer of 
2012, [Ed Miliband] was essentially trying to capture two things: [first] that although his “economic 
mission was fairly radical, it was a majoritarian one” and, second, he wanted to capture what was 
the spirit of the Olympics because what “Ed was really keen for the conference speech to do was to 
demonstrate how that spirit was a left spirit, so you could be patriotic but Labour.” It was, according 
to Stears, about generating a patriotic feeling that was about everyone doing their part and that 
everybody should be “concerned about the well-being of everybody in the country, not just the few 
people at the top” (Stears 2015). While this interview took place after the general election, 
interviews before the election corroborated Stears’ story that this engagement with patriotism was 
predicated on Miliband’s economic mission; a mission that was kept vague for the intended 
audience, the public.  
 
What was the economic mission then? A confidant to Miliband explained that part of the appeal of 
One Nation was that it allowed them to “come back to this notion of inequality”. It allowed “us to 
talk about the issue of [inequality]. [For example], why does a boy born in Glasgow today have an 
average life expectancy of 55, [while] somebody born in Bournemouth on the same day probably 
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lives to 84”. Essentially, argued a senior backbench MP, the emergence of One Nation “was a means 
of selling old principles: equality and eradicating poverty”. Miliband’s economic mission, according 
to these views, was about promoting the notion of tackling inequality. Inequality was a purposively 
understated theme in One Nation, because as a member of Miliband’s team put it after the general 
election: “we wanted to have a project, a sound-bite for a project, a character of a project which was 
about equality, but wasn’t lefty equality. It wasn’t hectoring about inequality”. This seemed to work, 
with a senior Labour backbencher commenting that One Nation was “an idea which can capture the 
imagination…that the [Labour] party was for everybody, not just for people on benefits”. The 
leadership was concerned that tackling inequality head on would be met with scepticism amongst 
middle class voters. This fear was reinforced in their minds as they met some internal resistance to 
the economic mission. A veteran left-wing MP recalled, “I remember someone saying to him [Ed 
Miliband], who is now quite high up [in the party], when I hear the word inequality and I’m middle 
class, I hear the sound of you thieving my privileges. I’m not having anything to do with inequality. 
Ed’s response was well I’m not compromising. That was a conversation almost within the first 24 
hours” of Miliband’s Labour leadership victory.  
 
According to a friend of Miliband’s, dealing with inequality “was always of central interest” to 
Miliband. Consequently, there was a determination to make this the central focus of the Labour 
party’s policy. This determination was corroborated by Miliband’s engagement with predistribution, 
a term coined by the Yale Professor Jacob Hacker. Delving into the details of this is beyond the remit 
of this paper, but it should suffice to say that Hacker suggested predistribution as an economic 
model to combat and reverse the growing income gap in the USA (see Hacker 2011 and Hacker and 
Pierson 2010). Predistribution was incorporated into One Nation, with Tristram Hunt (2013: 146), 
MP for Stoke Central and a member of the shadow cabinet, describing predistribution as the 
“political methodology of One Nation”. One Nation was thus an attempt to mix patriotism and 
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inequality; it was patriotic to tackle inequality and it had the added political bonus of marching on to 
Conservative territory.   
 
Except for a few MPs, these broader themes did not fully permeate throughout the PLP. I 
interviewed close to twenty backbench MPs and shadow ministers in 2013 and it became clear there 
was a lack of knowledge about One Nation’s purpose. While all MPs understood there was a 
rhetorical ambition to it, there were a wide variety of opinions regarding its purpose beyond that. 
Broadly, the mixture of opinions can be compartmentalised into two groups: (1) MPs who believed 
that there was substance to it and (2) the MPs who believed it to be entirely superficial. Those MPs 
who were supportive recognised there was a duality to One Nation: that it operated at the 
communicative level, but that it also aspired to be a ‘policy narrative’. For a shadow cabinet 
member, One Nation “[spoke] to an earlier sort of communitarian concept. It is all about 
nationalism, reciprocity, solidarity between people, communities – fundamentally Labour, left, 
Christian values that underpin Labour throughout [its] history”. A prominent backbencher argued it 
was both a communicative tool and an idea: “they are slogans [he simultaneously refers to the Third 
Way], but…they are ideological concepts. That’s creating the parameters in which we operate”. 
Another MP, a veteran backbencher, put it in more pragmatic terms: “you have to crystallise an 
emotion and philosophy into a short, snappy soundbite. Nowadays things have to be packaged into 
little bite-sized samples”. One junior shadow minister detailed the practical necessity of One Nation, 
which he defined as a framework, “I think it is very important that ideas sit within a bigger 
framework. If we didn’t have that concept and people came at us with random good ideas we would 
have ended up with a lot of interesting ideas that didn’t gel together, making it harder to 
communicate and probably less effective”.  Indeed, another junior shadow minister explicitly stated 
that “[Labour’s] policies were viewed through the One Nation prism”. A mixture of shadow ministers 
and backbench MPs, therefore, understood One Nation was an idea that was intended to act as an 
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umbrella for Labour’s forthcoming policies and simultaneously to communicate a vision, philosophy 
or theme to the public.  
 
The second and larger group of both backbench MPs and shadow ministers, however, were far more 
sceptical and unclear over the purpose of One Nation. One backbench MP explained, “I don’t really 
know what it means. It is a line in a briefing that you are supposed to repeat”. A long standing 
backbench MP shared this opinion, expressing the view, “it seems a crass idea…every prime minister 
or party leader seems to believe they need some slogan, some solution to everything”. This MP 
continued explaining that they “usually consist of three words: The Third Way, Back to Basics, the Big 
Society now. These gimmicks and ideas…no one talks about the Third Way now, and I don’t think 
anyone will talk about the Big Society after the next election”. This was the start of a recurring 
theme amongst sceptical MPs, namely that One Nation was disparagingly referred to as a slogan. 
Referring to the leadership of the party, a senior left-wing MP explained that in an attempt to 
differentiate themselves “they came up with a slogan – an old Tory slogan. I believe in the idea of 
One Nation…but who knows what it means?” The tone of such responses suggested that One Nation 
lacked substance and therefore it was pointless to seriously engage with it. To them, it was only a 
marketing tool. As a relatively new backbench MP observed: “the Third Way and One Nation are 
slogans” but they did acknowledge their utility ending with the sentence, “you have to be media 
savvy”. This view was reaffirmed by a veteran backbencher who noted that “in modern politics you 
need to have some handles. You need to have a badge.”  It would be a mistake, however, to see this 
particular view as the sole preserve of backbench MPs. For example, a shadow minister candidly 
stated that “One Nation isn’t an idea – it’s a branding.” He continued explaining that they had tested 
a lot of names, “I heard it could have been Next Generation Labour, Next Labour, Modern Labour, 
One Nation Labour”. In more stark terms, another senior shadow minister stated, “no, it wasn’t [an 
idea]. I mean it was a good speech delivered in Manchester, but anything could be One Nation”. A 
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close aide to Miliband, who spoke to me after the election, confirmed this by explaining “One Nation 
[was] not an idea. [It was] “a helpful label”. Given this figure was intrinsically involved in the entire 
policymaking process, members of the PLP were right to question the acclaimed substantive nature 
of One Nation advocated by some MPs and the Policy Review team.   
 
Clearly, amongst backbench and frontbench MPs, there was a variety of opinions about One Nation. 
However, a closer inspection of the responses reveals a unifying bond between them: a concern that 
there was no policy substance behind it. This view was almost universally held. In interviews held in 
2013, it was common to hear complaints that One Nation did not have “a fleshed out policy agenda 
behind it”, explained a junior shadow minister; “One Nation is not fully developed. It needs fleshing 
out. It is being developed across all spheres of government – this takes time” said a right-wing 
backbencher; and, “you need to create the whole sandwich, not just the surround of the sandwich. 
That [One Nation] creates the surround; that’s essential. But it’s not enough in itself”, explained 
another senior backbench MP. The need for policies to back it up was essential for it to last, 
according to a seasoned backbench MP. For that you have “to prove it is real; prove it affects the 
individual; and prove it will make [their] life better”. Another shadow minister explained One Nation 
was “an overarching idea”, but that it needed “more detail to sit behind it”. A veteran MP who had 
worked closely with Miliband also felt that although “in the modern world, that is used to 
advertising, [required us] to have a badge, there’s got to be more to it than just a badge; it’s got to 
have some substance”. As a result, another veteran MP, who had been a senior government 
minister, argued that One Nation was “disappearing just as fast as the Third Way. The reason for 
that is…we don’t provide a narrative behind it”. These concerns did not dissipate over time. In 2014, 
Chakelian (2014), a writer for the New Statesman, observed that One Nation had dropped off 
Labour’s lexicon during Labour’s conference that year. She asked several MPs why. Simon Danczuk, 
MP for Rochdale, told her “where the slogan is connected to policy, I think it has more resonance... 
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One Nation isn’t tied to anything, is it?” On similar lines, both Stella Creasy, MP for Walthamstow, 
and Chi Onwurah, MP for Newcastle upon Tyne Central, explained to her that One Nation did not 
resonate well with voters on the doorstep. This view was based on One Nation lacking policy detail 
which MPs could explain to voters. In interviews which took place in 2015, analogous problems were 
raised. An MP very close to the policymaking process stated frankly, “it was a good line for Ed to 
pursue, because [it was] cohesive and patriotic, but it needed to be developed as a substantive 
idea”. Even interviews undertaken post-election conveyed the same message about One Nation’s 
problem when it was first evoked: the ‘policy narrative’ lacked policies.  
 
Disconnect 
The Policy Review 
The Policy Review was the party’s official policymaking body under Ed Miliband, which he had set up 
in 2010 after his leadership victory. The Policy Review team, by the time of the evocation of One 
Nation, was headed by Jon Cruddas, MP for Dagenham and Rainham, who had replaced Liam Byrne 
midway through 2012. According to Gaffney and Lahel (2013b: 334), this change was made 
principally because under Byrne the review did not deal with “ideology and narrative.” Miliband 
appointed Cruddas to rectify this, and immediately began to develop the idea of One Nation after Ed 
Miliband’s One Nation speech in October 2012. A senior aide to Miliband recalled that “Cruddas was 
really excited [after that speech], because he thought Ed is finally not just talking to the left but to 
the country and trying to reach out. [So] he went back [to the Policy Review] with the idea that One 
Nation gave him the orientation for the next few months”. At the time, Cruddas (2013a: 5) openly 
stated this was the case: “in 2013 the Policy Review will be building the story of One Nation Labour 
and creating the policies that will give it detail and substance”.  This highlights the fact that when Ed 
Miliband evoked One Nation there was indeed no policy substance behind it and the Policy Review 
team knew it. Therefore, the team headed by Cruddas, in conjunction with people like Professor 
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Jonathan Rutherford, a close friend of Cruddas, felt they had to develop a number of policies to fill 
this vacuum. 
 
At the Labour party conference in 2013 the extent of this work was shown with the publication of 
the One Nation book entitled ‘One Nation: power, hope and community’ (Reeves and Smith 2013) 
and the release of two policy-focused documents, One Nation Economy (2013) and One Nation 
Society (2013) – the latter document was released a few weeks after the conference. The One 
Nation book was a collection of articles from the 2010 intake of MPs, edited by Rachel Reeves, MP 
for Leeds West, and Owen Smith, MP for Pontypridd. Its purpose was to showcase “the freshness 
and energy” of these new MPs and their ideas which had a “deep resonance [with] the values of One 
Nation” in the party and the country (Reeves and Smith 2013: 14). A member of the Policy Review 
team explained that the team had organised and put these “One Nation MPs together”, admitting 
the process “was all a bit top down, political management”. Nevertheless, the book itself was 
theory-heavy, but policy-lite. The Policy Review documents, on the other hand, were the complete 
opposite. They were explicitly policy-focused documents, setting out key policies of One Nation 
Labour. Ed Miliband (2013b: 5), in the foreword for the One Nation Society document, described 
“One Nation Labour’s goal” as helping to “build a stronger society, one where everyone feels they 
have a part to play in shaping Britain’s future”. Cruddas (2013b: 8) based the policies set out in One 
Nation Society on three pillars: devolving power to people; shifting resources from high cost reaction 
to prevention; and citizen contribution. All three focused on reshaping public services that routinely 
empowered and included citizens in their delivery and creation. In the One Nation Economy 
document, the joint foreword from Ed Miliband and Ed Balls stated that “a One Nation Economy [is] 
built on the understanding that Britain’s working people are our country’s greatest asset and so 
when they do well, Britain will do well too” (Miliband and Balls 2013: 6). Cruddas (2013c: 7 - 8) based 
the policies in this document on four pillars: a rejection of trickle-down economics and a re-focus on 
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everyone benefiting from growth; the backing of key areas that encourage economic growth and 
high quality jobs; challenging endemic economic problems within the country; and, a dynamic 
private sector.   
 
These One Nation documents conveyed the effort the Policy Review team had put into developing 
the policies that were to sit behind One Nation. It also reflected how Cruddas and Rutherford, in 
particular, had enthusiastically captured One Nation and had driven it, fervently trying to add 
substance to it after Ed Miliband’s 2012 conference speech. We know that part of this enthusiasm 
can be put down to the belief that Ed Miliband was finally speaking to the country, not just the 
party. However, the main reason for Cruddas’ and Rutherford’s enthusiasm was their belief that the 
evocation of One Nation was an opportunity to resurrect some of the key elements of Blue Labour, 
but under a different banner. This was picked up by a number of MPs, with a senior backbench MP 
arguing that “One Nation would not have happened without Blue Labour”. Cruddas and Rutherford 
had been advocates of Blue Labour (see Rowenna Davis 2011), but were left bereft after Blue 
Labour’s demise following a number of controversial comments made by Lord Glasman, its founder. 
A key exponent of Blue Labour explained, “it sort of blew up, Maurice (Glasman) went into hiding for 
six months and kept quiet. By that time it was all in pieces actually, I thought we had it [but it] all had 
disintegrated”, until “suddenly Ed asked Jon to lead the Policy Review”. In other words, Cruddas and 
Rutherford were handed another opportunity to re-engage in the debates Blue Labour had started. 
Apparently, this was an open secret, with a key player in the Policy Review team explaining “it was 
consolidating the thinking in and around what was known as Blue Labour into the heart of the party 
itself both in terms of the leadership, the advisors, the Policy Review, the sentiment or character of 
the party”. Another close source to the Policy Review believed this opportunity had been handed to 
them because “Ed knew Blue Labour was on to something. A lot of them understood that [they] 
were right somewhere” and One Nation captured some of that thinking. Outside observers 
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immediately picked up on the similarities between the two. Ferguson (2012), then the editor of 
Labourlist, posted an article the day after Miliband’s One Nation speech in which he argued that One 
Nation Labour was in fact “Blue Labour 2.0”. Stears (2015) acknowledged this and candidly stated 
that, “Yeah, that’s right. It was a moderated version of what Blue Labour had been about…it was a 
speech [the 2012 Leader’s speech] about ethos and the common good, and both those were Blue 
Labour concerns.” One Nation was a chance to resurrect aspects of Blue Labour, particularly and 
critically the aspect of patriotism, without the controversy that Blue Labour had by then acquired.   
 
For Rutherford and Cruddas, the idea of One Nation and their positions at the top of the Policy 
Review offered them not only an opportunity to develop key themes of Blue Labour, but to continue 
the intellectual renewal of the Labour party itself post the financial crash in 2008. One Nation would 
“address the question about what the Labour party is for”, explained a junior shadow minister 
(Interviewee 3). This view, in fact, was also held by Stewart Wood, a friend and key advisor to Ed 
Miliband. Wood, Rutherford and Cruddas thought that One Nation could be far more significant than 
a framework or a slogan: it had the potential to shift the political paradigm. Wood (2013: 319) 
argued that One Nation was “a challenge to the ethic of the post-79 settlement”, while Cruddas and 
Rutherford (2014: 14) followed this up a year later stating One Nation was nothing short of a bid to 
“build an alternative to the political settlement pioneered by the New Right.” This argument, 
although sincere at the time, was overblown. In hindsight, a member of the Policy Review team 
explained that One Nation was more about constructing a “narrative about what Labour stood for 
[and] how it saw the country”. What these quotes show, however, is that there was a disparity even 
amongst the Policy Review team regarding the possible scale of One Nation.  
 
Nevertheless, in 2013 and 2014, Cruddas, Wood and Rutherford believed One Nation could instigate 
a Thatcher-like shift in the political paradigm. Yet, this largely bypassed many MPs and shadow 
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ministers. This was exemplified by comments from two shadow ministers, one of whom said “all the 
One Nation stuff feels very remote to me…Jon Cruddas and few other people are doing things that 
will be gradually revealed to us”, while the other conceded that “I don’t really interact with the 
Policy Review, which is probably a failure on my part, but I think it’s probably also a failure of the 
Policy Review, because people aren’t that clear about how it engages with the PLP”. This, according 
to a prominent observer, led to Cruddas having a vision of what One Nation could have been while 
“most MPs just saw it as a brand. They saw a brand used at one conference, one speech and then 
get dropped” which was “partly because Labour MPs did not engage in Cruddas’ thinking and the 
Policy Review as much as he expected them to”. Perhaps more fundamentally, a critical member of 
the Policy Review team did not share the same vision for One Nation as Cruddas or Rutherford. This 
person told me, post-election, that the documents, One Nation Society and One Nation economy, 
were “not really attempts to broaden One Nation per se, but rather to widen the story over the 
economic agenda”. However, it was clear that this particular interviewee did not have a close 
relationship to Cruddas and Rutherford and was unsympathetic to their views. In fact, this 
interviewee’s evidence, as will become clear, closely reflected Ed Miliband’s view on One Nation. 
 
Ed Miliband and the Leadership team 
With the release of the book, One Nation: power, hope and community, Ed Miliband indicated, in its 
preface, that One Nation was more than a slogan: “One Nation is a British idea rooted deep in our 
history and language. It is not a Conservative idea or a Labour idea” (Miliband 2013c: 7).  What he 
did not say was that it was a temporary idea. Yet, Ed Miliband and Stears only envisaged, at least 
initially, One Nation as “a moment in Ed’s leadership” and “so when we gave the speech we had 
imagined [it] a temporary articulation of his vision, but not the final version” (Stears 2015). In 
corroboration, a close aide explained “I think for a lot of people in our team it was a device to deliver 
a good speech rather than an orienting framework for the next few months”. These post-election 
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responses were substantiated by interviews I undertook in 2013. For example, its temporary nature 
was alluded to by an MP close to Miliband, who said it was “a very useful slogan in projecting what 
Ed Miliband was trying to say at the time”; around the London Olympics. The intention, explained 
Stears (2015), was an attempt to utilise a phrase which would speak to the majority of the public and 
capture the spirit of the Olympics; to capture the “progressive patriotism and collective identity” 
that the Olympics had generated. However, there were two problems in developing it. The first was 
that One Nation had been expressed midway through the political cycle and “no serious opposition 
announces large chunks of policy halfway through” and second, “the bigger truth, is that no one 
expected it to be the success it was” (Stears 2015). The success lay in the positive response it had 
received from the British press. This caught the leadership team by surprise. A fellow close aide to 
Miliband substantiated Stears’ story stating that it was “broadly right”. This surprise success, it can 
be surmised, was the reason the leadership team paused, considered and then decided that One 
Nation should be developed. This would explain why, initially, Miliband acquiesced with Cruddas and 
Rutherford basing the whole Policy Review around the idea of One Nation. If it had failed, they 
would have moved on from One Nation, which was the original intention.   
 
Yet, One Nation did not last long. Despite “some of us who were really keen to make that our thing. 
We did for a while, then we didn’t anymore by mid-2013”, explained a senior Miliband advisor post-
election. Why was developing One Nation so short-lived? There were several factors, all of which 
mutually reinforced each other. Firstly, there were a few interviewees who alluded to Ed Miliband 
having the character trait of “intellectual restlessness”, which tended to motivate him to “move on 
from one thing to another”. As a close adviser stated, “Ed had a tendency to alight on interesting 
things and then move on too quickly”. Secondly, as several interviews unveil, Miliband was never 
truly wedded to One Nation, always planning it to be temporary in nature. It was only its initial 
success that prompted a greater commitment to it, yet this was always superficial. In Miliband’s 
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mind, One Nation was never the final version of Labour’s message to the electorate. Thirdly, and 
finally, Stears (2015) explained that “not enough people within the team bought into the same 
vision. The [pollsters] definitely didn’t want all that stuff, they wanted straight-forward economic 
appeal… strategists wanted a stronger retail appeal.”  
 
Therefore, within the leadership team, there was a divide over the nature and purpose of One 
Nation. In the end, the strategists and pollsters prevailed, and by mid to late 2013 Miliband switched 
to the ‘cost of living’ narrative, believing that the continuing wage squeeze was setting the economic 
agenda and such a switch would speak better to people’s concerns. This was noticed by a 
backbencher at the end of 2013 who stated that “we’ve obviously done focus groups asking what 
[voters] think and clearly people are feeling the cost of living crisis. So we are now seen more in 
touch with that because we keep going on about it”. This moment appears to be highly significant, 
with a senior advisor stating at this time they “were no longer re-thinking how the Labour party does 
its work anymore, we were in which policy works?”. This marked a shift in Ed Miliband’s thinking and 
in the ideational discourse in the party. It became more focused on retail policies, dropping the 
bigger thinking on ideas and the regeneration of the party. 
 
The precise point of this seminal switch, according to a senior aide, was the policy announcement of 
the “energy price freeze” in Miliband’s Labour conference speech in 2013. This is interesting, 
because this policy would have easily fitted within the One Nation narrative, but Miliband decided 
not to frame it under the One Nation banner. Instead, he chose to promote it, as well as others, as 
stand-alone policies. He stated that:  
“if we win the election 2015 the next Labour government will freeze gas and electricity 
prices until the start of 2017. Your bills will not rise. It will benefit millions of families 
and millions of businesses. That’s what I mean by a government that fights for you. 
That’s what I mean when I say Britain can do better than this” (Miliband 2013d).   
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This “went so well, [that] Ed just wanted more of those. So we ended up, through a focus group 
process, producing an energy price freeze, cap rents on the social sector, but also an immigration 
mug and sticking to Tory spending limits”. That speech was the moment the “ideas project gets 
marginalised”. This move towards a retail policy offer was noticed and lamented by people in the 
Policy Review team. Riddell (2015), for example, noted Cruddas’ disillusionment with the way Ed 
Miliband was not addressing the big intellectual questions and was instead reverting to a policy 
retail offer aimed at achieving 35% of the vote. This interpretation was substantiated by interviews 
undertaken with members of the Policy Review team. One explained that “there were moments in 
2012…where this stuff was in play and it was energetic and exciting, there was a possibility that we 
could mainline into the total strategy of the party through the One Nation Trojan horse”, but “[Ed 
Miliband] moved into the cost of living frame”. Others explained, with post-general election 
hindsight and in a rueful and disappointed tone, that “I think Ed saw that as a tactical move, not a 
strategic opening where he could take the party. And then, after less than six months, Greg Beales 
came up with more polling which said cost of living, he dropped One Nation, the cost of living 
became the thing”. This retail turn and the dropping of One Nation was instructive of the disconnect 
between the main protagonists of the Policy Review team and Ed Miliband. In short, there was a 
fundamental disagreement over One Nation’s purpose and nature.  
 
The Policymaking Machinery and One Nation 
In 2013, Labour’s party conference openly displayed this disconnect between the different principal 
centres of the Labour party’s policymaking machinery. On the face of it, the Policy Review team, in 
conjunction with the shadow cabinet and the National Policy Forum (NPF), were primarily 
responsible for creating policy. In reality, policymaking was a far more disjointed and informal 
process. In many instances, members of the shadow cabinet, explained one such member, were 
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“told to do our own thing” in relation to the creation of narrowly focused policies consonant to their 
portfolios. However, from a broader perspective, an MP close to Miliband informed me that:  
“I don’t think the shadow cabinet under Ed Miliband acts as a sort of policy motor, it’s more 
a coming together for a reaffirmation of purpose or redefinition. I think the work goes on 
elsewhere, but it won’t [happen] at shadow cabinet. The shadow cabinet is the icing on the 
cake if you like. It’s not the cake”.  
 
Another interviewee close to the leadership substantiated this analysis, stating clearly that policy 
“didn’t come from other members of the shadow cabinet, for better or for worse”. Policy, largely, 
also did not come from the NPF. Instead, its role focused on “consolidat[ing] a lot of thinking in 
terms of the formal policy party positions”, but even in this regard the leadership team influenced it 
heavily (Stears 2015). When it did develop some policies, noted a member of the Policy Review 
team, “some of it was good, some of it was rubbish, it was all pretty generic, there was nothing 
innovative there at all”. Its primary purpose was “about protecting the party from itself”, explained a 
previous member of the NPF and junior shadow minister. Therefore, in practice both the NPF and 
shadow cabinet were consultative policymaking bodies, as opposed to playing a collaborative 
developmental role. In reality, according to a senior advisor to Miliband in an interview undertaken 
post-general election, policy was developed by Torsten Bell, Head of Policy in Ed Miliband’s office, 
and his team: “The instinct of that team was to run everything from the centre. And that’s the way 
Ed wanted it, it wasn’t Torsten’s fault, Ed wanted it that way. Torsten was based in Miliband’s office 
[and] policy was produced in deadlines for speeches.” Not a single interviewee expressed the view 
that the NPF played a critical role in policy development, but a number recognised the centrality of 
the leadership’s office, particularly Torsten Bell. 
 
The official policymaking body, the Policy Review, can be demarcated into two distinct parts, Mark I 
and Mark II (Gaffney and Lahel 2013b: 331). For Gaffney and Lahel (2013b), Policy Review Mark I 
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covered the period of Liam Byrne’s leadership between November 2010 and May 2012. Policy 
Review Mark II started with the replacement of Byrne with Cruddas. This is important to recap, 
because there is a Policy Review Mark III period. While Gaffney and Lahel’s analysis finished mid-way 
through 2013, my analysis concluded on May 2015. Policy Review Mark III covers the period when 
Cruddas and Rutherford were effectively side-lined and became subordinate to Greg Beales, Director 
of Strategy and Planning for the Labour Party, and Torsten Bell. As a Miliband advisor stated after 
the election, “Cruddas and Rutherford did not run the Policy Review”.  
Diagram 1 – The Policy Review Periods 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: partially drawn from Gaffney and Lahel 2013b: 331) 
 
Policy Review Mark III started at Labour conference 2013 when Ed Miliband turned away from ideas 
and went towards a retail policy offer. According to a member of the Policy Review team this 
moment represented “Ed’s worst instincts” in terms of a technocratic approach to policymaking, 
which this interviewee defined as, “choose a policy this week, poll it, popular, then next week, 
another policy and keep going -  a retail offer”. A fellow interviewee concurred, stating “I think that 
is right, I agree with that. I think from conference 2013 we stopped being in the ideas business 
altogether. It was a deliberate shift on Ed’s part, he made a choice at conference that year to go for 
the energy price freeze. That inaugurated a period when we were much more in the business of 
retail policies”. This was disparagingly referred to by David Axelrod, brought in by Miliband as a 
senior strategic advisor, as a “vote Labour and win a microwave” strategy (Wintour 2015). Yet, unlike 
the obvious change of the Head of the Policy Review which underlined the migration from Mark I to 
Mark II, the change to Mark III was not obvious. It was informal in nature, with Ed Miliband directly 
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asking Torsten Bell, in conjunction with polling from Greg Beales, to develop policy, largely bypassing 
Cruddas and the Policy Review. This dealt a fatal blow to One Nation. I was told from this point 
onwards that “Torsten Bell was instrumental in keeping separate the Policy Review and the thinking 
that was going in the meetings from the inner policymaking which was orientated around Ed”. In 
effect, Cruddas “wasn’t in charge of his own Policy Review. Torsten and his team [ran everything]”.   
 
From Cruddas’ and Rutherford’s point of view, Labour’s 2013 conference was the public platform to 
display the more fleshed out One Nation idea. They had co-ordinated the release of the One Nation 
book and had started to publish One Nation policy documents, which explicitly combined the One 
Nation narrative with specific policies. While these policies largely remained until the 2015 general 
election, the overall narrative was effectively side-lined with the success of the energy price freeze 
policy. This shift was orchestrated by Ed Miliband. Meanwhile, and simultaneously, Cruddas and 
Rutherford carried on with their own timetable, agenda and structure. This is evidenced by the 
release of the eBook, One Nation: Labour’s political renewal in September 2014, a long time after Ed 
Miliband’s turn to the ‘cost of living’ narrative. This was because, explained a member of the Policy 
Review team, “Jon was arguing for the bigger story, the more romantic side of politics. What we 
needed first was the politics and the story, and then the policy would illustrate and give it detail”. 
Although Cruddas lost that battle, he never gave up making his point.   
 
Conclusion 
This battle was just a symptom of the disconnect between the leadership team, the Policy Review 
and the wider PLP over the purpose of One Nation, the dynamics of which I have set out in the 
diagram 2.  
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Diagram 2 – Two Policymaking Centres and One Nation 
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Review, there was a paucity of evidence to suggest that this filtered out to other shadow ministers 
or the wider PLP. Moreover, the arrows intentionally do not show a two-way communication 
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arguments between individual members of each centre, but there was little evidence to suggest the 
Policy Review hierarchy’s views influenced the leadership. Diagram 2 also highlights the hierarchical 
nature of the policymaking process in relation to One Nation in the sense that Ed Miliband always 
made the final decision. Lastly, while diagram 2 simplifies the situation, it broadly captures the 
fundamental position of each centre in relation to One Nation and the resulting confusion it caused 
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fundamentally undermined the One Nation idea. 
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With the failure of the Labour party to own and utilise the idea of One Nation, the Conservative 
party took its opportunity to re-capture it. The morning after the Conservatives’ general election 
victory, David Cameron (2015a), outside Downing Street, said “we will govern as a party of One 
Nation, one United Kingdom. That means ensuring this recovery reaches all parts of our country 
from north to south, from east to west, and indeed it means rebalancing our economy, building that 
northern powerhouse.” As the days and months passed, it became clear this was not a one off 
statement made in the aftermath of victory. In May, the Government published its Queen’s Speech. 
In its introduction, Cameron (2015b: 5) wrote, “this Queen’s Speech [is] a clear programme for 
working people, social justice, and bringing our country together – put simply, a One Nation Queen’s 
Speech from a One Nation Government”. He explicitly equated the Government’s policy programme 
with the rhetoric of One Nation, especially and crucially around social justice. In June, Cameron also 
delivered a speech on opportunity where he explained that “whether you are middle income or low 
paid or not in work at all, whether you live in a leafy suburb or an inner-city community, this 
government wants to extend opportunity, and what in the election campaign I called a good life, for 
all. That for me is the ‘One Nation’ ideal” (Cameron 2015c). By July, One Nation was prominent in 
the Government’s economic sphere, with George Osborne (2015) delivering a ‘One Nation budget’ in 
the summer which was from “a One Nation government…that takes the necessary steps and follows 
a sensible path for the benefit of the whole of the United Kingdom”. This speech was followed up 
with the publication of a policy paper entitled, ‘Towards a One Nation economy’ a month later in 
August. Although it was a specific departmental document which outlined a ten point plan for 
boosting rural productivity, it nevertheless displayed a commitment to the One Nation narrative by 
the Conservatives and a determination to apply it to all areas of Government policy. These 
immediate moves from the Prime Minister shows that the Conservatives had worried and feared 
Labour’s evocation of One Nation. They were mindful of the potency of the One Nation argument. 
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These moves were recognised by Ed Miliband, now a backbench MP, in early June 2015.  During a 
parliamentary debate on the Queen’s Speech, he gave his first speech as a backbench MP. The 
subject matter focused on the economy, inequality and a One Nation government. He cited Disraeli, 
expressed admiration for the spirit of One Nation and concentrated his remarks on inequality, social 
mobility and how it affected the economy. He argued that “the debate about inequality is that, 
internationally and across the political spectrum, there is growing recognition that these gaps are 
not just bad for the poor, as we always used to believe, but bad for all of us” (Miliband 2015). In line 
with this, he welcomed the Government’s “One Nation rhetoric”, but urged them to follow through. 
He explained that “tests on inequality, low pay and a compassionate social security system are 
appropriate tests for a Government claiming the mantle of One Nation” and he concluded that the 
opposition would hold the Government to account on its “own tests: One Nation in spirit and deed” 
(Miliband 2015). This intervention was clearly prompted by the Conservatives reclaiming the One 
Nation territory, but also, perhaps, by the realisation of a missed opportunity and a regret that he 
failed to pursue that narrative. Even if Miliband holds no regret, Dame Margaret Beckett (2016: 9), in 
her inquiry into why Labour lost the 2015 general election, cited that there was a “need for a clear 
and consistent vision and political narrative”. She continued in the report that “we should spell out 
the vision in language which is as clear, simple and inspiring as we can make it - ‘campaign in 
poetry’” (Beckett 2016: 30). Even a backbencher, in 2013, lamented what he saw as a lack of vision 
articulating the feeling that “we need an inspiring, visionary, positive plan for the future”. In effect, 
Dame Margaret Beckett’s conclusion was that under Ed Miliband the Labour party lacked a clear 
consistent vision which could then be communicated effectively to the public. The fact that the 
Conservatives, after winning their first majority government in nearly 20 years, moved swiftly to 
recapture the One Nation mantle serves only to emphasise the scale of the Labour party’s missed 
opportunity. 
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